ANALYSIS:
Lt. Cdr. Harry M. DARDEN was authorized to take a flight of three TBM's on a navigation flight to Tampa, Florida. The flight was composed of three Avengers. The flight leader was Lt. Cdr. Harry M. DARDEN, A-3 USNR (Org. Reserve). The number 2 plane in the formation was piloted by Ens. WAGBOB. The number 3 plane piloted by Lt. William E. AFFLEET, Jr. A-3, USNR. The flight took off from NAS, Miami at 1044 with Ens. WAGBOB immediately joining up in the number two position. Upon departure from the control area number three plane was trailing several hundred yards behind. After proceeding on a course of 315° true for approx. 10 mins. and climbing to 6000 ft., the number three plane lost sight contact with the other two planes and returned to base, as attested to in Lt. AFFLEET's statement. It is the opinion of this board formulated from Lt. Cdr. DARDEN and Lt. AFFLEET's statements, weather conditions and pertinent facts and information concerning the flight that: (1) Lt. Cdr. DARDEN did not maintain strict compliance with Contact Flight rules in that he proceeded over an overcast and entered heavy rain. (2) Lt. Cdr. DARDEN did not maintain proper military flight discipline in that he allowed his flight to struggle and become separated in adverse weather conditions. (3) Ens. WAGBOB separated himself from...
**ANALYSIS:**

Lt. Cdr. Harry M. DARDEN was authorized to take a flight of three ZH-1s on a navigation flight to Tampa, Florida. The flight was composed of three Avengers. The flight leader was Lt. Cdr. Harry M. DARDEN, A-3 USNR (Org. Reserve). The number (2) plane in the formation was piloted by Ens. WAGNOB. The number (3) plane piloted by Lt. William E. APPLEY, Jr. A-3, USNR. The flight took off from NAS, Miami at 1044 with Ens. WAGNOB immediately joining up in the number two position. Upon departure from the control area, number three plane was trailing several hundred yards behind. After proceeding on a course of 315° true for approx. 10 min., and climbing to 5000 ft., the number three plane lost sight contact with the other two planes and returned to base, as attested to in Lt. APPLEY's statement. It is the opinion of this board formulated from Lt. Cdr. DARDEN and Lt. APPLEY's statements, weather conditions and pertinent facts and information concerning the flight that: (1) Lt. Cdr. DARDEN did not maintain strict compliance with Contact Flight rules in that he proceeded over an escarpment and entered heavy rain. (2) Lt. Cdr. DARDEN did not maintain proper military flight discipline in that he allowed his flight to struggle and become separated in adverse weather conditions. (3) Ens. WAGNOB separated himself from TERRY.
from the flight leader and that upon being separated, became
disoriented or experienced vertigo resulting in the crash.
The specific cause remains undetermined.

SPECL.EQUIP:
The shoulder harness was effective in that it was used;
However the seat was torn from the plane on the
impact with the ground.

LOG. REG:
Pa Pettibone as well as existing directives are
constantly brought to the attention of pilots
concerning the restrictions attendant with a C.F.R.
clearance. This will be continued.

GENERAL:
Local Flight Rules: A ceiling of 1000 ft. and a forward
visibility of three miles is prescribed as the minimum
requirements for contact flight at the point of
departure, along the route, and at the destination.
regarding violations of contact flight rules.
Safety Bul. No. 10-45 para. (g): States that wingman
who became separated from their leaders in the overcast
too often were not able to re-orient themselves imme-
diately through instruments, and crashed out of control.
BuAer Manual Art. 6-304: States that air traffic rules
established by the Civil Aeronautics Board are binding
on Naval Personnel.
Civil Aeronautics Regulations Part 60.110 (a): States
weather minimum for contact flight.

G01
All pilots have been impressed with the fact regulations
concerning adverse weather must be strictly observed.
Due to the limited amount of flying inactive Reserve
Pilots do, it is mandatory that flight discipline
be frequently brought to their attention.